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whether an attorney is a debt collector under the FDCPA may not involve
such clear facts.
E. CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW
Dinh v. Rust International Corporation
974 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1992)
Virginia's statute of repose, 1 7" which the legislature originally enacted
in 1964,178 prevents a personal injury or wrongful death claim arising out
of a defective condition of an improvement to real property if more than
five years have passed following the date of the construction. 179 Upon
expiration of the five-year period, the statute vests rights of repose in
those responsible for the design or construction of such improvements. 10
The statutory rights of repose insulate such manufacturers from liability
arising out of a defective design or production flaw. 81
In Wiggins v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 182 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the 1964 statute of repose
protected the manufacturers of a machine that the company had attached
to the floor because, as the Wiggins court reasoned, the machine was an
improvement to real property. 83 In response to the Wiggins decision, the
Virginia legislature enacted an amendment to the statute of repose in
1973.184 This amendment excluded the manufacturers of such equipment
or machinery affixed to real property from protection of the statute. 85
However, in Hupman v. Cook"86 the Fourth Circuit held that if an
installation was five years old at the time of the 1973 amendment, then
the 1964 statute of repose still protects the manufacturers and installers
of such machinery and equipment.
18 7
Two other controversial issues with respect to Virginia's statute of
repose were whether the statute's protection extends retroactively to im-
provements before the statute's enactment in 1964, and whether the statute
satisfies the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The
177. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Michie 1977).
178. VA. CODE § 8-24.2 (1950).
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Michie 1977).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 330 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd in an unpublished opinion, No. 71-1952 (4th
Cir. Mar. 8, 1972).
183. Wiggins v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 350, 352-53 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd
in an unpublished opinion, No. 71-1952 (4th Cir. Mar. 8, 1972).
184. 1973 Va. Acts c.247; see also Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 331
S.E.2d 476 (Va. 1985) (characterizing 1973 amendment as correcting Wiggins decision).
185. 1973 Va. Acts c.247.
186. 640 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1981).
187. Hupman v. Cook, 640 F.2d 497, 499 (4th Cir. 1981).
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Fourth Circuit settled the first issue in Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp.,18 holding that pre-enactment improvements to real prop-
erty fell within the statute's protection provided that those who had
acquired causes of action prior to the 1964 statute had an adequate
opportunity to file suit after the statute's enactment.8 9 The Owens-Corning
court, however, refrained from addressing whether the statute may con-
stitutionally extinguish a claim before the cause of action ever accrued. 190
In Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp.,191 the Fourth Circuit held that the statute,
which merely prevents a cause of action from ever arising, does not violate
the Due Process Clause. 192 Against this background, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered in Dinh v. Rust Intl
Corp. the issue of whether Virginia's statute of repose prevented a personal
injury claim arising out of an allegedly defective machine that the company
installed in 1959, five years prior to the statute's original enactment.
In Dinh, the plaintiff, Thuyen Hoang Dinh, worked at a Virginia
brick factory. When the company built the brick factory in 1959, the
company installed a 13,000 pound conveyor machine which the company
secured to the floor by heavy bolts. In November 1989, Dinh suffered
severe injuries when the pulley mechanism of the conveyer machine en-
tangled his leg, requiring the amputation of the leg.
Dinh thereafter filed a personal injury claim in the United Sates District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the companies responsible
for designing, manufacturing, and installing the conveyer machine. The
district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the ground
that Virginia's 1964 five-year statute of repose vested substantive rights in
the defendants prior to the enactment of the 1973 amendment. Thus, the
plaintiff never acquired a cause of action against the defendants.
On appeal, Dinh argued that the statutory rights of repose never vested
in the defendant companies because the 1964 statute did not extend
retroactively to improvements before the statute's enactment. Furthermore,
Dinh contended that the Due Process Clause of the United States Consti-
tution required the continued existence of common-law causes of action.
The Fourth Circuit noted that Dinh did not argue on appeal that the 1964
statute of repose did not apply to the type of machine that caused his
injury. Nor, as the Fourth Circuit noted, did Dinh allege that the 1973
amendments, which expressly excluded the manufacturers and suppliers of
machinery that companies install in their factories, applied retroactively
to exclude the defendant companies from the protection of the 1964 statute.
Dinh conceded, moreover, that the legislature may not subsequently de-
stroy substantive rights of repose after those rights have vested in potential
defendants.
188. 385 S.E.2d 865 (Va. 1989).
189. Commonwealth v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 385 S.E.2d 865, 869 (Va. 1989).
190. Id. at 869 n.5.
191. 392 S.E.2d 817 (Va. 1990).
192. Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 392 S.E.2d 817, 821 (Va. 1990).
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The Fourth Circuit, therefore, focused only on whether Virginia's
statute of repose may apply retroactively to protect the defendant com-
panies in this case, and whether the statute may constitutionally extinguish
a common-law cause of action before a plaintiff could acquire a right of
action. In addressing the first issue, the Fourth Circuit cited the Owens-
Corning rule that the five-year statute of repose extended to protect those
responsible for improvements before 1964. The Fourth Circuit then cited
the Hess rule that the United States Constitution does not prevent a state
from prospectively redefining or even abolishing a common-law right of
action.
The Fourth Circuit examined the facts of Dinh in light of the Owens-
Corning and Hess rules. The Dinh court held that any cause of action
that the plaintiff might have had in this case no longer existed after 1964,
five years after the defendants installed the conveyor machine and after
the legislature enacted the statute of repose. Thus, the concurrence of the
two events, the statutory enactment and the lapse of the five-year period,
vested substantive rights of repose in the defendant companies which
protected the companies from liability. The Fourth Circuit noted that the
fact that the injury occurred after the five-year period is irrelevant to the
analysis because the statute of repose simply extinguishes any right to sue
the manufacturer upon lapse of the statutory period. Finally, the Fourth
Circuit held that the abolition of Dinh's right of action did not violate
the United States Constitution. The Dinh court stated that the plaintiff
has no constitutional right to the continued existence of a common-law
right of action, and the state, therefore, may prospectively extinguish the
cause of action. The Dinh court accordingly affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
Dinh v. Rust Intl Corp. is the first case decided after the 1973
amendment to Virginia's statute of repose in which the Fourth Circuit has
applied the 1964 statute retroactively to protect those responsible for the
design, manufacture, and installation of a machine which a company
installed prior to 1964. Nevertheless, prior Fourth Circuit opinions resolved
the key issues in Dinh. The Fourth Circuit's holding, therefore, merely
represents a logical extension of the case law expounding upon Virginia's
statute of repose.
Linton v. Frederick County Board of County Commissioners
964 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1992)
Well established principles of constitutional due process require that
adequate notice and an opportunity for response precede an intentional
government deprivation of a protected private property interest. 93 The
193. See Linton v. Frederick County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 964 F.2d 1436, 1439 (4th
Cir. 1992) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), for
proposition that due process requires notice and opportunity for hearing as prerequisite to
intentional government deprivation of protected property interest).
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specific type of notice and opportunity required varies according to the
nature of each case. 194 In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,'95
the United States Supreme Court affirmed that this Due Process Clause
protection ensures some rudimentary pretermination process to public
employees who may be discharged only for cause. At the very least,
tenured public employees are entitled to some notice of the evidence
supporting specific charges against them and to the opportunity of pre-
senting an informed response before they are discharged.
96
Until recently, no federal court had addressed whether the inclusion
of unspecific, generic allegations renders constitutionally deficient a notice
that adequately details other charges justifying termination. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Fraternal Order of Police
Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker,'97 came the nearest to addressing that issue. The
Third Circuit reinforced that a Loudermill "meaningful pretermination
hearing" requires an explanation of the employer's evidence sufficient to
allow the employee to clarify or rebut that evidence, and held that the
defendant Police Commissioner's unspecific reference to "a complaint of
drug use involving police officers" fell short of Loudermill's minimum
notice requirements. 98 The Third Circuit reached this conclusion notwith-
standing its express acceptance of the trial court's finding that plaintiff
police officers were discharged not for their suspected drug use, but for
disobeying an order to undergo urinalysis. ' 99 The court found that the
Commissioner's vague drug use allegations overshadowed the proffered
termination justification-disobedience.
In Linton v. Frederick County Board of County Commissioners,2°° the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit squarely confronted
the question of whether a notice of dismissal that adequately details charges
sufficient to justify termination is rendered fatally defective by the inclu-
sion of unspecific, generic allegations. The Linton court evaluated a
discharged county employee's claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.201 The
employee argued that defendant Frederick County Highway Department
(Department) had violated his right to pretermination process by serving
him a written notice of dismissal which he said he did not understand.
The parties agreed on the basic facts underlying Linton's termination:
Linton, a longtime employee of the Department, performed work on
several occasions without securing a permit required by the Maryland
Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The DNR reprimanded the
Department for each of these violations. After Linton admitted responsi-
194. Id.
195. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
196. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
197. 868 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989).
198. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989).
199. Id.
200. 964 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1992).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
19931
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bility for the last of these infractions, his supervisor handed him a
memorandum styled Notice of Dismissal (Notice) and offered him the
alternative of resignation instead of discharge. The following day, Linton
refused to resign and was fired.
Linton argued in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland that the notice given him was constitutionally inadequate because
it neither provided him with an explanation of the evidence substantiating
the charges it contained nor a meaningful opportunity to respond to those
charges. The district court rejected these allegations, granting summary
judgment in favor of the county officials, and Linton appealed.
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Linton's state-granted status
insulated him from arbitrary dismissal, and thus was a property right
meriting the procedural safeguards insured by Loudermill. This threshold
property interest requirement satisfied, the dispute centered on the amount
of process due, and whether the Notice comported with that minimum
standard.
The court first noted that the supervisor's oral inquiry and Linton's
response satisfied one goal of the pretermination process guaranty: to
avoid factually mistaken decisions. Next, the court observed that due
process in such situations does not require exhaustive documentary disclo-
sure of the employer's evidence. All that is required, the court held, is an
explanation descriptive enough for the employee to identify the conduct
giving rise to the dismissal so that the employee will be able to respond
intelligently.
The Fourth Circuit found that the supervisor here had provided a
sufficiently specific accounting of the DNR-connected incidents and that
Linton's discharge was based on these episodes. Therefore, even though
the Notice included the very vague assertion that unspecified "other
incidents" also justified Linton's termination, the court found that the
minimum standards of due process had been met. It held that the inclusion
of generalized language does not render notice constitutionally defective
as long as the core charges giving rise to the termination are adequately
detailed.
The court stopped short of stating a rigid rule, pointing out that if
the real cause of termination were hidden in generalized accusations, and
specific charges were included in a pretermination notice only to disguise
that real motive, an employee would have insufficient information to
recognize the criticized conduct and respond to it. Such notice would be
constitutionally deficient. But if notice explains sufficient charges on which
termination is actually based, the constitutional demand for due process
is satisfied whether or not less specific catch-all allegations are added.
The Fourth Circuit here reached a facially different outcome than the
Third Circuit did in Tucker. However, in view of significant contextual
distinctions between the two cases, these courts' applications of Loudermill
can be comfortably reconciled. The vague drug abuse allegations in Tucker
appeared inextricably entangled with the straightforward charge of resis-
